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Abstract
Watermarking techniques have been proposed during the last 10 years
as an approach to trace network flows for intrusion detection purposes.
These techniques aim to impress a hidden signature on a traffic flow.
A central property of network flow watermarking is invisibility, i.e., the
ability to go unidentified by an unauthorized third party. Although widely
sought after, the development of an invisible watermark is a challenging
task that has not yet been accomplished.
In this paper we take a step forward in addressing the invisibility prob-
lem with DropWat, an active network flow watermarking technique de-
veloped for tracing Internet flows directed to the staging server that is the
final destination in a data exfiltration attack, even in the presence of sev-
eral intermediate stepping stones or an anonymous network. DropWat is
a timing-based technique that indirectly modifies interpacket delays by ex-
ploiting network reaction to packet loss. We empirically demonstrate that
the watermark embedded by means of DropWat is invisible to a third
party observing the watermarked traffic. We also validate DropWat and
analyze its performance in a controlled experimental framework involv-
ing the execution of a series of experiments on the Internet, using Web
proxy servers as stepping stones executed on several instances in Amazon
Web Services, as well as the TOR anonymous network in the place of the
stepping stones. Our results show that the detection algorithm is able
to identify an embedded watermark achieving over 95% accuracy while
being invisible.
1 Introduction
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) have received an increasing amount of at-
tention from authorities and companies in recent years. APTs refer primarily
to the high-risk threats associated with unauthorized access to a network, with
the primary aim of stealing highly sensitive and valuable information. Behind
every APT there usually is an adversary with specific objectives that fall into
∗Authors are with Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD), Singapore. (e-
mail: alfonso iacovazzi@sutd.edu.sg; sanat sarda@sutd.edu.sg; daniel frassinelli@sutd.edu.sg;
yuval elovici@sutd.edu.sg).
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the following categories: political [25], economic [7], technical [24], and mil-
itary [11] purposes. Although APTs are difficult to generalize, because each
attack is focused on a specific target and designed accordingly, the process of
implementing an APT can be broken down into six main stages which have been
well described by Giura and Wang [14]: reconnaissance, delivery, exploitation,
operation, data collection, and data exfiltration. Each step in this process mer-
its specific attention; however, in this paper we focus on the data exfiltration
stage.
Data exfiltration is the last stage of an APT, and its achievement represents
a successful conclusion to the entire attack process. The term data exfiltration
refers to the physical process aimed at transferring previously collected sensi-
tive data from a private device/network to an external staging server under the
control of an adversary. Data exfiltration has been widely investigated [13, 6],
and much attention has been focused on developing solutions that may pre-
vent data exfiltration, detect a data exfiltration attack, and even nip it in the
bud, before data has been stolen [29]. In contrast, the research community has
put less effort into developing technical solutions for attack attribution, i.e.,
aimed at real-time identification of the adversary (individual or machine) that
is attempting to obtain valuable data.
Increasingly, the process of data exfiltration is taking place over the Internet
by means of digital communication between a device containing the sensitive
data and the remote staging server. The adversary managing this data transfer
often forwards the communication over a chain of proxy servers or an anonymous
network; this is done in order to prevent others from tracing the devices under
control of the adversary (by reading the destination addresses) back to the
adversary, particularly when traffic flow interception has occurred.
Identifying the final destination of a data flow is a difficult problem, which is
often referred to in the literature as the “network traceback problem” [8]. Net-
work flow watermarking is a promising solution that has provided interesting
insights during the last few years. Typically, watermarking solutions aim to ac-
tively modify traffic features so that they can be easily identified by a detection
system, even when several noisy network nodes are crossed. Although much
progress has been made in this area, two important issues remain unresolved:
robustness and invisibility. Robustness refers to the property of the watermark’s
resistance to active noise added by an attacker to alter the watermark carrier
features. Invisibility is the property of the watermark to go undetected by the
adversary. Invisibility is critical, because any kind of traffic feature manipula-
tion has potential to be easily identified by a third party (using traffic analysis
instruments).
In this paper we propose DropWat, an invisible network flow watermarking
technique for data exfiltration attacks, enabling the identification of the staging
server that receives the exfiltrated data. DropWat is based on a completely
new paradigm of injecting a watermark into the flow. The basic idea of our
algorithm is to drop a few selected packets of a flow in order to alter the inter-
packet delay. We show that: 1) packet drop events can be identified, even in the
presence of several stepping stones, and that they can be used as a way to con-
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voy a watermark into traffic flows, 2) natural packet loss and intentional packet
drop events in the network cannot be distinguished from each other, and 3) the
watermark embedded with our algorithm is invisible. We evaluate DropWat
under different network scenarios with different conditions of packet loss and
throughput, on real traffic on the Internet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of previous work on network flow watermarking and its application in overcom-
ing the traceback problem. The attack scenario and reference architecture are
described in Section 3. The DropWat embedding and detection algorithms are
described in Section 4. Section 5 contains an in depth discussion and analysis
of the invisibility property. Section 6 provides a description of our experimental
results and validation of the effectiveness of DropWat. In Section 7 we discuss
some critical aspects of our watermarking algorithm, and our conclusions are in
Section 8.
2 Related work
The traceback problem, aimed at identifying the real destination of a traffic flow,
has been extensively investigated [39, 41, 42, 26, 10, 34, 17]. In 2001, Wang et
al. introduced network flow watermarking as a possible means of overcoming
the traceback problem [46]. Since then, many network flow watermarking al-
gorithms have been developed and proposed. Recently, Mazurczyk et al. [33]
and Iacovazzi et al. [21] presented surveys providing a comprehensive analysis
and comparison of the main network flow watermarking solutions known in the
literature.
The vast majority of the proposed techniques modify the packet timestamps
in order to impress a specific timing pattern onto the network flows [45, 35, 36,
20, 44, 15, 18, 19]. RAINBOW is an example of a timing-based watermarking al-
gorithm [20], where each packet is delayed by a computed value; the delay values
equal the output of a cumulative function which randomly evolves with a step
of plus/minus a specified watermark amplitude per each packet. RAINBOW’s
detection algorithm is based on the comparison between the interpacket delays
(IPDs) of the flow before being watermarked and those of the flows intercepted
by the detector.
The technique proposed by Peng et al. [35] is also based on IPDs. The
authors consider two groups of randomly selected pairs of consecutive packets;
the IPDs are computed for every pair in each group. The two average values of
IPDs in the two groups are considered statistically equal to each other. Their
proposed watermarking algorithm aims to slightly modify the IPDs, so that the
difference between the two average values is not zero. The numerosity of the two
groups represents a kind of redundancy and determines the detection reliability.
A technique called interval centroid-based watermarking was introduced by
Wang in 2007 [44]. In this technique, the time axis is divided within intervals
of fixed duration T . A centroid is computed for each interval as the average
value of the remainders remaining after dividing the timestamps of packets
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observed in that interval by T . In the embedding algorithm, some packets of
the flow are delayed so that the statistical balances among groups of intervals
are altered. Watermark detection is based on the statistical analysis of interval
centroids. A variety of similar methods have been also suggested by other
researchers [18, 30, 43].
In interval packet counting-based techniques, the time axis is divided within
intervals [19, 36, 49]; the number of packets in each interval is the carrier of
the watermark, and some packets of the flow are delayed in order to alter the
statistical balance of the packet counting per interval.
Timing-based algorithms are very attractive, because packet timing can eas-
ily be modified by the watermarker without having to access the data at any
protocol level. Nevertheless, timing can also be altered by natural network per-
turbation or be artificially modified by an attacker, resulting in the failure of
watermark detection. For this reason, other watermarking algorithms have been
created that are robust against timing perturbation [45, 35], repacketization [36],
and chaff packet injection attacks [35, 20].
One major drawback of timing-based schemes is that they primarily target
flows with less than 50 packets per second (PPS). If, for example, we consider
a scenario such as an illegal data transfer in which the transfer rate can easily
be 200 – 500 PPS or more (assuming 1500 bytes/packet, and a speed of 300
– 750 KB/s), these algorithms would not be effective. The reason for this is
that most of the parameters have to be re-adapted in order to cope with the
higher network speed and lower IPD. However, at higher network speed, proxy
servers tend to obfuscate any kind of slight timing perturbation, making small
changes impossible to detect. One could argue for the use of more significant
perturbations, but this would make the watermark more visible and significantly
impact the performance of the network (and not necessarily improve the detec-
tion rate, since generally the parameters need to be chosen proportionally to
the IPD). The only technique that would be able to work with bulk traffic is the
centroid-based solution developed by Wang [44], but it would also require a lot
of buffering and TCP level multi-flow analysis which makes it impracticable to
implement in border routers where network speed, memory, and computational
power are generally strict constraints.
Timing is not the only feature that can be used as a watermark carrier;
packet size [37, 28, 5] and bit rate [9, 47] are two traffic features that have
attracted attention as well. However, size-based watermarks need to be embed-
ded directly at the source of the traffic flow, while rate-based watermarks are
strongly visible to third parties.
Invisibility (the capability of passing unnoticed by an attacker) is one of
the most important properties of a watermark algorithm. Although some re-
searchers have designed watermarking algorithms that were claimed to be invis-
ible [47, 20, 16], later studies have empirically shown that a completely invisible
watermark does not exist yet [23, 31, 32, 27, 22].
4
Staging 
Server
Company’s 
Network
SSSS
Internet
Infected 
Devices
Figure 1: Attack scenario.
3 Attack scenario
3.1 Data exfiltration attack
We consider the scenario shown in Figure 1 in which an adversary wants to take
possession of confidential data, files, or documents that belong to a person or
company and are stored in digital format on a device connected to the Internet in
some way. These documents can be sensitive, private, copyrighted, or accessible
only with required permission. In our scenario, the attacker has managed to
install a malware on the targeted device. This malware allows the attacker to
control the device and exfiltrate data from the private network to an external
server (staging server) under her control, via an Internet connection. Two or
more stepping stones are used in order to disallow possible identification of the
staging server (its IP address, IP address geolocation, etc.). Once the targeted
data is saved on the staging server, the attacker is able to access the data at
any time. If the staging server is identified, the attacker may be identified as
well, when it connects to the server.
3.2 Stepping stones
A stepping stone (SS), also referred to as a proxy server, is an intermediary
device or application interposed in the communication between two hosts in
a network. The main purpose of an SS is to prevent the identification of the
real sender and/or recipient of the exchanged messages, in the event that a third
party intercepts the communication. The property of a flow to not be associated
with the communication’s real endpoints is known as the “unlinkability” of the
sender and receiver. In this case, whenever a client wishes to contact a server
for Web content, it does not send messages directly to the server, but instead
it connects and sends the messages to a proxy server which is responsible for
forwarding the traffic to the real recipient. Conversely, reply messages from the
server to the client will first be delivered to the SS and then be forwarded to the
client. In most cases, communications to and from an SS are based on encrypted
and authenticated connections. Thus, the integrity of unlinkability property is
preserved when a third party observes the traffic in the middle of one of the two
connections involved; nevertheless, the communication is vulnerable to passive
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attacks performed on the proxy server. A single point of vulnerability can be
avoided by using two or more SSs in a chain.
3.2.1 Implementation and packet loss propagation
There are many types of SSs and ways of implementing them: Web proxy
servers, TOR software, etc. [12]. An explanation of different SS implementations
and a description of their operations are not within the scope of this paper; we
prefer to focus on how the implementation of a SS may influence traffic patterns
in cases in which a packet loss occurs before reaching the SS. In these cases, the
SS can behave as the propagator or retriever of lost packets. The SS behavior
depends on the combination of two factors: 1) the protocols used for transferring
the traffic, and 2) the protocol layer at which the SS operates. For example, let
us consider communication over TCP: when the SS handles data units at the
transport layer, two independent TCP connections are established, one from
the client to the SS, and the other from the SS to the server; when a packet
directed to the SS is lost, the SS notices that a packet is missing and requests
retransmission, so the loss is not propagated. Thus, here the SS acts as a
retriever. Alternatively, an SS can also be implemented to work at the network
layer (such as an NAT service). In this case, the source and destination of
transport layer segments retain the real communication’s source and destination.
Here the SS is only responsible for being an intermediary at the network layer.
The two endpoints send their IP packets to the SS which decapsulates transport
segments from packets, makes port translation, and encapsulates each segment
in a new IP packet containing the SS’s IP address in the source address field and
the real destination’s IP address (or the next hop’s IP address in case of a chain
of SSs) in the destination address field. Here the SS changes the transport layer
ports, but it does not interfere with the operations performed by the transport
protocol which means that packet loss is propagated to the next hop of the path.
Thus, in this scenario, the SS acts merely as a propagator.
In this paper we refer to an attack scenario in which SSs do not propagate
packet loss, as this scenario is used by most attackers by implementing their
own proxy networks or using TOR because it does not leave a trace of real IP of
their staging server. Nevertheless, a slightly modified version of our algorithm
would work in cases of SSs propagating loss.
Without loss of generality, hereafter we base our analysis on a scenario in
which communications travel over TCP, and the SS operates at the transport
layer.
4 DropWat algorithm
In this section we describe DropWat, a watermarking technique based on
packet dropping, which indirectly modifies IPDs of selected packets. The basic
idea of our technique is to mimic a natural network behavior, namely packet
loss events caused by a single bottleneck node, and exploit it as a watermark
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Figure 2: Packet loss event in a scenario with one SS.
identifiable despite the traffic flows crossing one or more SSs.
An attacker is not able to distinguish between naturally lost packets and
those intentionally dropped, because both events cause the same behavior in a
network.1 If the attacker is unable to distinguish between a sequence of lost
packet events due to a real bottleneck node and a sequence of dropped packet
events caused by an emulated bottleneck node, then the watermark will be
invisible.
In the following subsections we explain what happens in our scenario when
a packet loss event occurs; we then provide a detailed description of DropWat,
our proposed watermarking method for tracing data exfiltration attacks.
4.1 Packet loss occurrence
Packet losses occur naturally in computer networks and are caused by several
reasons, such as faulty hardware or cabling, buffer overflow due to link or node
congestion, data corruption due to components with high bit error rates, packet
filtering, etc. Internet protocol (IP) provides a service of best effort delivery; it
does not deal with detecting and recovering lost packets. The management of
packet recovery for reliable delivery is left to higher layer protocols. Recovery
of lost packets can be guaranteed at the transport layer with the TCP protocol.
The behavior of an SS handling data units at the transport layer in a case of
packet loss is depicted in Figure 2. The left half of the figure shows the typical
1We use the term intentionally dropped packets to indicate only those packets that are
dropped in order to embed a watermark in the traffic flow. Packets dropped due to other
causes (e.g. buffer overflow, framing error, etc.) are considered naturally lost packets.
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Figure 3: The impact of packet loss events on IPDs measured on the client side.
TCP behavior when a packet is lost. It can be seen that the SS sends dupli-
cated acknowledgements until it receives the expected packet. The server keeps
sending subsequent packets until it realizes that a loss has occurred, and then
it re-sends the lost packet. The time required before re-sending a lost packet
depends on the TCP implementation used by the sender. When fast retransmis-
sion is adopted, a packet is sent a second time after receiving a specified number
of repeated acknowledgements (usually set to three in the most commonly used
TCP stack implementations). Since the TCP connection endpoint is at the SS,
the TCP protocol reorganizes out of order data at the SS application layer, so
that data[11]− data[16] cannot be delivered until data[10] is correctly received.
For this reason, when a packet is lost, the SS cannot keep sending data to the
next hop even though out of order packets are received by the TCP protocol.
This entails that the IPD between data[10] and data[9] at the destination will
be altered and equal to a value greater than the round trip time from the server
to the SS.
In Figure 3 we show the trend of the IPDs measured at the client endpoint,
when a 50 MB file is downloaded from the server. The communication is in-
termediated by two SSs. A packet was periodically dropped in the connection
between the server and the first SS encountered. The round trip time (RTT)
between the two was 80 ms. During the first few seconds of the communica-
tion, IPDs are affected by the TCP’s slow start. After the slow start phase,
the system reaches a stable state in which the IPDs maintain regular values.
The regularity is broken when a packet loss event occurs, as highlighted in the
figure. The trend is maintained even in the presence of multiple SSs. Thus,
we can claim that although the packets are sent sequentially from the SS, any
packet lost (and later retrieved) in the first connection can be identified in the
second connection by analyzing IPDs on the client side.
The server packet transfer rate and the RTT between the server and the
first SS may change the effect of packet loss events on IPDs. To give an idea
of this effect, we averaged the values of the IPDs that correspond to the packet
loss events measured on the client side, and we plotted them in Figure 4 as a
function of the RTT from the server to the SS. The graph shows a linear trend
when the transfer rate R is 2.2 MB/s, a constant and later linear ramp for R =
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Figure 4: Average value of the IPDs that correspond to the packet loss events
plotted as a function of the RTT from the server to the SS.
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 [M
B/
s]
2.2 MB/s
1.0 MB/s
0.5 MB/s
Figure 5: Throughput as a function of packet loss rate.
1 MB/s, and a constant trend for R = 0.5 MB/s. This is due to the fact that
IPDs, altered by packet loss, are a function of both transfer rate and RTT.
When the number of lost packets in the network becomes high, the TCP
protocol interprets this behavior as network congestion and reacts by reducing
the rate at which packets are sent. The reduction of the throughput caused by
varying the packet loss rate is shown in Figure 5. Thus, in order to ensure that
the embedded watermark does not have a significant impact on the network
performance, the packet loss rate should be less than 1%.
4.2 Watermarking architecture
The architecture of DropWat is similar to other existing active network flow
watermarking techniques. As shown in Figure 6, the system is composed of a
watermarker and a detector. The watermarker intercepts targeted flows and
embeds the watermark. In our case, this action corresponds to selectively drop-
ping some packets. The detector observes and analyzes traffic flows, and looks
for the presence of a watermark. In the following two subsections the watermark
embedding and detection algorithms are described in greater detail.
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Figure 6: Architecture of the DropWat watermarking system.
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Figure 7: Variation on the extended Gilbert model.
4.3 Watermark embedding
DropWat’s embedding algorithm aims at dropping pseudo-randomly selected
packets so that the sequence of dropped packets looks like a loss sequence caused
by a single bottleneck node. A single bottleneck node can be described as a
buffer which can hold a specific number of packets. An input process fills the
buffer with packets coming from several sources; an output process extracts
packets from the buffer at a fixed rate limited by the output link rate. When
an incoming packet finds the buffer full, it will be discarded and a loss event
will occur.
In order to emulate the behavior of a single bottleneck node, we model packet
loss behavior according to a modified version of the extended Gilbert model.
The extended Gilbert model was used to reflect packet loss behaviors in noisy
networks by Sanneck et al. [38], and Yu et al. [48] demonstrated that this model
very well approximate the packet loss behavior of a single multiplexer. Let Xi be
the binary event for the i-th packet of a flow, which can assume the value 1 for a
dropped packet, and 0 for a non-dropped packet. In our modified version of the
extended Gilbert model, an event state is assumed to be dependent on the last
run composed of up to n consecutive identical events. In this model (hereafter
referred to as W) we need only 2n different states, and it can be completely
described by the set of probabilities {pW,−n, pW,1−n, . . . , pW,−1, pW,1, . . . , pW,n}.
The model of packet drop states is depicted in Figure 7.
The watermarking process, as depicted in Figure 8, can be divided into two
parts: offline initialization and online packet dropping. The algorithm evolves
as a periodic process with time period T . Let T0 = 0 be the zero time reference,
we indicate the starting time of the i-th time period as Ti = iT .
The offline initialization takes as input: 1) the model probabilities {pW,−n,
pW,1−n, . . . , pW,−1, pW,1, . . . , pW,n}, 2) a secret key shared with the watermark
detector, 3) a watermarker identifier IDdw, and 4) the reference throughput R.
The concatenation of the secret key and IDdw will be used as the seed of the
dropping sequence generator (DSG), a cryptographically secure function gener-
10
DSG𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖 𝐼𝐷𝑑𝑤
Offline
Initialization
𝑝𝑊,𝑘 0< 𝑘 ≤𝑛, 𝑅
Dropper
Incoming flow
query(i)
𝐃 1 , 𝐄 1
𝐃 2 , 𝐄 2
𝐃 𝑖 , 𝐄 𝑖
…
…
𝐃 𝑖 , 𝐄 𝑖
Figure 8: DropWat embedding scheme.
ating a pseudo-random binary sequence (sequence of events) which follows the
model W. Let B(i) = [b(i)1 , b(i)2 , . . . , b(i)N ] indicate the i-th binary sequence gener-
ated by the DSG, where N = dR ·T/Lrefe is the expected number of packets in
the period, Lref is the reference packet size computed as the maximum trans-
mission unit (MTU), and ∆tpkt = Lref/R is the time required to send a packet.
The throughput R can be set at the maximum transfer rate of the watermarker.
The DSG can be efficiently implemented by using two secure pseudo-random
number generators (PRNG). The first, prngsyn, is used to synchronize the wa-
termarker and the detector, as shown in Algorithm 1, and is initialized using
the shared key shared key = secret key|IDdw and the initial time T0.
Algorithm 1 Synchronization
1: procedure syncDSG(shared key, T0, T )
2: prngsyn ← new PRNG(shared key)
3: Tcurr ← T0
4: while Tcurr < system.timeNow() do
5: prngsyn.genRand() . Generate a pseudo-random number in [0, 1)
6: Tcurr ← Tcurr + T
7: end while
8: return prngsyn
9: end procedure
After every time period T , a new seed = prngsyn is generated by Algorithm
1 and used to initialize a second prngdsg. This newly created prngdsg is used to
generate a valid binary sequence B(i) of length N by executing Algorithm 2.
The binary sequence is then converted to a dropping sequence. A dropping
sequence corresponds to a sequence of packet dropping time intervals, and it is
described by two vectors D(i) = [d
(i)
1 , d
(i)
2 , . . . , d
(i)
Ki
] and E(i) = [e
(i)
1 , e
(i)
2 , . . . , e
(i)
Ki
]
of length Ki, where d
(i)
k and e
(i)
k indicate the starting time and the duration,
respectively, for the k-th dropping time interval, expressed in nanoseconds, and
Ki is the number of dropping intervals in the i-th time period. The dropping
sequence conversion is performed by means of Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 2 Binary Sequence Generation
1: procedure genDSG(prngsyn, {pW,k}0<|k|≤n, N)
2: seed← prngsyn.genRand()
3: prngdsg ← new PRNG(seed)
4: B← new vector()
5: k ← −n
6: while B.size < N do
7: if prngdsg.genRand() < pW,k then
8: B.append(1)
9: k = max{1,min{k + 1, n}}
10: else
11: B.append(0)
12: k = min{−1,max{k − 1,−n}}
13: end if
14: end while
15: return B
16: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Dropping sequence conversion
1: procedure DSC(B, ∆tpkt)
2: D, E← new vector()
3: while k <= B.size do
4: n← 1
5: if B[k] == 1 then
6: n← countOnes(k, B) . Count consecutive ones from position k
in B
7: D.append(k ·∆tpkt)
8: E.append(n ·∆tpkt)
9: end if
10: k ← k + n
11: end while
12: return D, E
13: end procedure
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The dropper works by discarding all of the packets traversing the water-
marker during any dropping time interval. All of the other packets will be
correctly forwarded to the proper interface.
4.4 Watermark detection
The detector is placed at one or more points in the network where we might ex-
pect to observe watermarked flows. It analyzes all traffic and tries to understand
whether a watermark is embedded in any of the observed flows.
The detector is aware of the input data to the DSG and the cryptographical
function used by the watermarker, so it can compute all of the dropping time
intervals. The detector analyzes the IPDs for packets observed during the drop-
ping time intervals, and for each flow it builds the sequence of identified lost
packets. If a significant percentage of lost packets of a flow are detected during
the dropping time intervals, the flow is suspected of being watermarked.2 The
detector and the watermarker must be accurately synchronized in order to agree
on the valid dropping sequence for a time period; to maintain synchronization
over a long period of time, an external synchronization server (such as NTP)
may be used to reset the internal clocks of the two devices.
The watermark detection algorithm can be summarized in three main steps:
1) IPD computation, 2) outlier detection, and 3) watermark identification. The
three steps are only performed for the packets observed during the dropping
time intervals.
• IPD computation. An IP flow is sniffed, and packet timestamps are mea-
sured. A nominal task, IPD computation is based on the difference of
consecutive packet timestamps.
• Outlier detection. IPDs are analyzed to identify packet loss events. The
identification is based on a simple outlier detection algorithm. Let tˆk be
the timestamp of the k-th packet observed at the detector, ∆tˆk = tˆk− tˆk−1
be the k-th IPD, and v be a comparison window size. ∆tˆk is considered
an outlier if (α ·∆tˆk) > ∆tˆh for all h ∈ {k− v, . . . , k− 1, k+ 1, . . . , k+ v},
with 0 < α < 1. The observation times of the outlier packets are used
to compile an outlier time vector Dˆ(i) = [dˆ
(i)
1 , dˆ
(i)
2 , . . . , dˆ
(i)
Kˆi
] where dˆ
(i)
k is
the observation time, expressed in nanoseconds, measured considering the
start time of the current period Ti as the reference time. The outlier time
vector can be compiled almost in real-time, with a delay of v packets.
• Watermark identification. The watermark can be detected in the flow by
counting the number of dropping intervals in which we observe at least
one outlier. Let γi be the number of dropping intervals with an outlier
identified in the i-th time period; if γi/Ki is greater than a predefined
threshold β, the flow is labelled as watermarked.
2Since burst losses are managed by the TCP protocol through burst retransmissions, the
detector can only identify the first dropped packet of a burst. For this reason, the burstness
of packet loss is not relevant to detection.
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5 Invisibility
A watermark should go unidentified by the adversary, because otherwise she
could take some action to prevent the staging server from being detected, say,
for example, by interrupting the communication, or in some way preventing the
adversary from connecting to the identified staging server so it won’t be identi-
fied. Invisibility is an important property of a watermark, and it is challenging
to obtain. We refer to the definition of statistical invisibility as defined by Iaco-
vazzi [21] saying that “a watermark is statistically invisible if the difference be-
tween the statistical distribution of a watermarked flow and a non-watermarked
flow is negligible.”
5.1 Threat model
In order to analyze the invisibility of DropWat, we consider a threat model
where an adversary is able to accurately identify the packet loss events in the
observed communication. DropWat pseudo-randomly drops packets according
to a modified version of the extended Gilbert model with predefined parameters;
although the adversary cannot distinguish between dropped and lost packets,
she may suspect the presence of a watermark when the observed statistical
behavior differs from a natural behavior. In our model of threat against the
watermark’s invisibility, the adversary is able to use the watermarker as a black
box (thus, she has no knowledge about what is happening internally), and let
her traffic traverse it in order to observe the losses and derive the corresponding
loss model. If the packet drop model used by the watermarker exactly fits the
loss model of a real bottleneck component, the adversary cannot distinguish
between the two and is therefore unable to differentiate watermarked from non-
watermarked traffic. However, when the loss model used for dropping packets
only approximates a real behavior, the adversary might suspect the presence of
a watermark. This implies that the property of invisibility is strictly related to
the goodness of fit of the probabilistic model used to drop packets.
In the next subsection we show that the packet drop statistics of Drop-
Wat overlap with the statistics of a real network component that loses packets
because of natural buffer overflow.
5.2 Evaluation of DropWat’s degree of invisibility
We evaluated the goodness of fit and DropWat’s degree of invisibility based
on an empirical study of the loss density and the autocorrelation function (ac-
cording to the analysis adopted by Yu et al. [48]).
Let W and M be two statistical models describing the watermarker and
the single bottleneck node, respectively. Given the binary vector of packet loss
events B = [b1, b2, . . . , bN ] observed for traffic going out of the black box, which
can be either the watermarker or the bottleneck node, composed of N packets,
the adversary aims at recognizing whether B has been generated by M or not.
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Figure 9: Experimental setup.
This can be cast into a hypothesis test problem, with simple hypothesis H =W
and H =M.
The loss density fB(k, q) is the frequency of k loss events in a block of q
events, and the autocorrelation function ρB(h) for lag h is defined as
ρB(h) =
ch
c0
(1)
where
ch =
1
N − 1 ·
N−i∑
i=1
(bi − b¯)(bi+h − b¯). (2)
We measured fB(k, q) and ρB(h) for real traffic captured in a controlled
experiment. We created a simple network composed of three nodes (Figure 9):
1) a traffic source equipped with IXIA BreakingPoint VE, a commercial traf-
fic generator software capable of generating network traffic at a rate of up to
1 Gbit/s; 2) an intermediate node, acting with the role of either bottleneck or
DropWat watermarker; and 3) a traffic destination node where traffic was col-
lected in order to extract the corresponding binary vector of packet loss events.
We configured the source node in order to generate two types of traffic with
average transfer rate at Rgen = 900 Mbit/s: 1) enterprise traffic composed of
a mix of 15 classes (HTTP Video, HTTP Audio, HTTP Text, SIP/RTP Direct
Voice Call over TCP, SIP/RTP Direct Voice Call over UDP, SMTP Email, AOL
Instant Messenger, DCE RPC, SMB Null Session, SMB Client File Download,
NFSv3, PostgreSQL, RTSP, SSH, and FTP), and “bandwidth” traffic contain-
ing only HTTP and peer-to-peer file sharing, with bandwidth shared evenly
(among HTTP, BitTorrent, and eDonkey).
We executed two sets of experiments: one in which the intermediate node was
a bottleneck node implemented on a Linux device with a limited egress queue
of predetermined size z = 10 pkts, and one in which the intermediate node
was the watermarker. 100 GB of traffic was transferred for each experiment.
Using the scenario with the bottleneck node, we conducted 11 experiments; the
binary vectors extracted from 10 experiments were used to compute the selected
metrics, while the last binary vector was used as a training dataset to estimate
the probabilities {pW,k}0<|k|≤n to use in the model W. 10 experiments were
also conducted using the scenario with the watermarker.
Figures 10 and 11 provide a comparison of the loss density (for q = 150) and
the autocorrelation function for the two modelsW andM with two compositions
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Figure 10: Loss density functions and autocorrelation functions for enterprise
traffic.
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Figure 11: Loss density functions and autocorrelation functions for bandwidth
traffic.
of traffic classes. The figures show that the statistics for modelW nearly match
those measured forM, and they always stay within the uncertainty level ofM.
In order to obtain a numerical measure of the invisibility of DropWat,
we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to determine whether an observed
sample generated by the model W induces to accept or reject the hypothesis
H = M. The test is based on the cumulative distribution function FB(k, q)
defined as
FB(k, q) =
k∑
i=0
fB(i, q) (3)
Let FJB (·) be the empirical distribution function of the model J , with J ∈
{W,M}. In the KS test the hypothesis H =M is accepted if
sup
k
|FWB (k, q)− FMB (k, q)| <  (4)
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We conducted the hypothesis test against BM and BW (two sequences of
events observed in the two experiments with a bottleneck and a watermarker,
respectively). The KS distances obtained for the two types of traffic are listed
in Table 1. In each case the KS distance is below 0.0009 which corresponds to
high confidence (99%) that the two sequences, BM and BW , come from the
same distribution. Thus, the watermark injected through DropWat will be
invisible to any third party.
Table 1: Kolmogronov-Smirnov distances.
Type of traffic b¯ KS distance
Enterprise 0.001834 0.000873
Bandwidth 0.001413 0.000733
6 Performance evaluation
We analyze the efficacy of DropWat based on experiments performed in the
wild, with real traffic passing through the Internet. Performance was evaluated
for two different network scenarios that are usually used for data exfiltration: 1)
a scenario where SSs were implemented as Web proxy servers on Amazon Web
Services (AWS), and 2) a scenario where the traffic is forwarded over TOR, the
well-known onion routing network.
6.1 Scenario with Web proxy servers
We developed a testing framework in which each node of the network topology
is executed in an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instance on
AWS. Figure 12 shows the scheme of the framework. The main components in
this architecture are:
• Virtual private cloud (VPC): a logically isolated network unit in AWS
where one or more EC2 instances can be launched.
• Internet gateway (IG): a gateway that interconnects the instances in a
VPC with the Internet.
• Victim: an EC2 instance representing the infected device of a company or
a person where sensitive data is stored. For testing purposes the module
implementing the watermarker has been installed on this instance. A mod-
ule which throttles the traffic in order to limit and control the bandwidth
used by the malware is also installed on this instance.
• Staging server : an EC2 instance representing the remote server where the
attacker forwards the exfiltrated data.
• Stepping stones (SSs): two EC2 instances used in two different VPCs,
interposed in the communication from the victim to the staging server.
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• Additional packet dropper (APD): an EC2 instance that randomly drops
packets independently of the watermarker. This is used to test the robust-
ness of DropWat.
• Detector : an EC2 instance which sniffs and collects all of the traffic going
to the staging server, located in the same VPC as the staging server.
The four VPCs were distributed in different geographic regions. A VPC can
be launched from one of AWS’ 14 regions, distributed around the world; this
implies that all of the traffic going from one node to another node passes through
the Internet. Our experiment relied upon all of these regions: 10 regions were
used to run the SSs, and the remaining four regions were employed to run the
VPCs of the victim and the staging server. We used an “m4.xlarge” instance
for the victim and an “m4.large” for the staging server, both equipped with a
Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Base operating system. All other instances
were “t2.micro” equipped with an Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS.
6.2 Scenario with onion routing servers
In this scenario we used the testing framework described in the previous sub-
section with a few differences: 1) the two SSs running on the EC2 instances
were substituted with three onion routers belonging to the real TOR network,
2) the module throttling the traffic installed on the victim’s instance and the
APD were removed.
6.3 Implementation
6.3.1 Remote administration tool
Typically, an intruder performs an exfiltration attack by exploiting a remote
access Trojan (RAT) which is usually downloaded invisibly on a victim’s device
within the targeted company network. Once the RAT malware program has
been installed, a backdoor is created allowing an attacker to obtain administra-
tive control over the targeted computer. We used a commonly used backdoor
malware for Windows systems, generated by Cerberus RAT (a RAT software
publicly available on the Internet) and installed on the victim instance; the
Cerberus remote controller was installed on the staging server.
6.3.2 Stepping stones
In scenario A, SS implementation is based on SSH protocol. A putty SSH client
was used to create two SSH tunnels from the victim to each SS. Proxifier [4], a
Windows-based proxy software, was used to set up two SOCKS-based proxies
in the victim: one to channel Trojan-based TCP connections to the SSH tunnel
connecting to the second SS, and the other one to divert the SSH tunnel of
the second SS via the SSH tunnel connecting to the first SS. This creates an
end-to-end encrypted channel, with one SSH tunnel encapsulated into the other.
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Figure 12: Scenario with Web proxy servers in AWS.
We set up 20 SSs distributed over 10 different AWS regions. At the beginning
of each experiment two SSs were randomly selected by the victim, and the two
corresponding SSH tunnels were established.
In scenario B, the application traffic from the victim instance was tunnelled
through the onion network using Torifier, a Windows-based torification tool
[2]. We used the default TOR configuration that uses three relays to build the
circuit. At the beginning of each experiment three TOR relays were selected
by the victim, and a new circuit was established. In cases in which the selected
circuit was exactly the same as the previous experiment, one of the three relays
was substituted with a new randomly selected relay.
6.3.3 Watermarker
An application conducting the offline and online functions of the watermarker,
implemented in C++, was executed on the victim instance. In the online appli-
cation, Windows Packet Divert (WinDivert) [3], a packet filter library available
for Windows distribution, was used to filter and queue network flow packets from
the Windows network stack to the watermarker. Based on the precomputed
dropping sequence, all of the packets observed during dropping time intervals
were dropped.
6.3.4 Network throughput and additional packet loss
Network throughput can affect the performance of DropWat. We used the
NetLimiter program [1] (installed on the victim instance) to throttle the Cer-
berus traffic and test different values of bandwidth use.
Increasing the packet loss in the network was suggested by Sadeghi et al. [40]
to mitigate covert channels based on packet drops. We tested the robustness
of DropWat against several rates of additional packet loss; NetEm, a Linux
facility for traffic control, was used in the Linux instance acting as a APD in
order to emulate different network packet loss rates and test the robustness of
DropWat.
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(c) R = 2.2 MB/s
Figure 13: True and false positive rates in the scenario with Web proxy servers
(β = 0.25).
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Figure 14: True and false positive rates in the scenario with Web proxy servers
(β = 0.35).
6.3.5 Detector
For testing purposes, detection was performed offline. Thus, no specific imple-
mentation was required in our framework - only an instance to intercept and
sniff all of the traffic directed to the staging server was deployed.
6.4 Numerical results
DropWat’s accuracy was evaluated by conducting an extensive series of exper-
iments; 7200 experiments on AWS and 500 experiments on TOR were executed,
varying values of several parameters: the transfer rate R, the packet dropping
rate pW , and the additional packet loss rate pL. Each experiment consisted of
transferring a file of size 150 MB from the victim to the staging server. We
measured the true positive (TP) parameter as the percentage of the water-
marked flows correctly classified as watermarked, and the false positive (FP)
parameter as the percentage of non-watermarked flows erroneously classified as
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Figure 15: Number of packets required to detect a watermark (β = 0.25 in red
and β = 0.35 in black).
watermarked.
A training phase was performed on a training dataset composed of 50 traces
in order to test several values of the outlier threshold α and comparison window
v, and to select the values to use in the evaluation of the system. After the
training phase, we selected α = 0.8 and v = 300 pkts. The selection of the
{pW,k}0<|k|≤n to use in the model W was made based on a training trace made
of 100 GB of traffic, captured in the bottleneck setup described in Section 5.
Figures 13 and 14 show the TP and FP rates obtained in our experiments in
the scenario with Web proxy servers, for three values of transfer rate (R =0.5,
1.0, and 2.2 MB/s) and two values of β (0.25 and 0.35). On each graph, TP (red)
and FP (black) rates are plotted for different values of pL and with various packet
dropping rates pW . Each point on the curves corresponds to an average value
computed over 100 experiments. FP rates were evaluated by testing the detector
with both non-watermarked traces and traces watermarked with a wrong seed.
As can be seen in the graphs, the detection algorithm is able to correctly
detect watermarks, achieving very high TP rates (over 95% in most cases) and
low FP rates (below 5%). Although variations on transfer rates did not signifi-
cantly affect performance, we observed a minor deterioration in TP for cases in
which transfer rate is 2.2 MB/s, nevertheless it is still effective to detect water-
marks with few errors. When packet loss is greater than a specific threshold, a
significant amount of noise is added to the sequence of IPDs which very slightly
hinders the outlier detection function. For the same reason, TP rates also wors-
ened as the combination of packet loss and packet drop frequencies increased.
In addition, we observed a slight deterioration in the TP rate for β = 0.35.
This is due to the fact that increasing the level of the detection threshold β re-
duces the implicit redundancy inside the watermark, which affects DropWat’s
TP, but at the same time it drastically reduces FP rates. Thus, the detection
system is highly effective even at a higher threshold with less error. A slight
downturn in TP rates can also be observed for pW = 0.5 ·10−3; this is explained
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Figure 16: True and false positive rates in the scenario with onion routing
servers.
by the fact that in this scenario not enough packets are dropped before the file
transfer ends. FP rates increase in a scenario with high packet loss rate and low
throughput when we consider a threshold β = 0.25; nevertheless FP rates are
below 5% in all of the other cases. Therefore, we can state that, for practical
implementation, watermarks can be detected with almost 100% TP and 0% FP
rates with the fine-tuning of the system parameters according to the knowledge
of network loss behavior, even with the presence of a mitigation technique.
Figures 15 show the number of packets required to detect the watermark
for three values of transfer rate (R = 0.5, 1.0, and 2.2 MB/s). On each graph,
curves are plotted for three values of pL, and for β = 0.25 (red) and β = 0.35
(black), by varying the packet dropping probability pW . Each point on the
curves corresponds to an average value computed over all of the experiments
that resulted in the correct identification of a watermark. The number of packets
needed to identify the watermark ranges from 104 to 1.5 · 105. It is no surprise
that in all of the cases the number of packets required for detection decreases
linearly as the packet dropping rate increases.
We also tested DropWat in a scenario with the TOR network. Even though
TOR is not optimal for performing the transfer of massive amount of data, test-
ing the watermarking system in a scenario with onion routing servers allows
us to stress robustness in the presence of a significant amount of noise that
is largely due to relay instability, large end-to-end delay, and large jitter. Fig-
ure 16, shows the TP and FP rates for two values of pW by varying the threshold
β. Despite the slight decrease in performance, we can detect the watermark in
95% of cases (best instance), with an FP rate below 10%.
7 Discussion and challenges
Unlike the other watermarking algorithms known in the literature, DropWat
has the following properties: 1) it is invisible to the adversary; 2) it is effective,
even with a high transfer rate; and 3) it is effective against traffic passing through
the TOR network.
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Dropping packets on a pseudo-random basis implies that deterministic anal-
ysis would not provide any evidence of the watermark. Additionally, statistical
analysis would be incapable of this as well, because the packet loss behavior
induced by DropWat reflects a natural behavior of loss in the network.
The extensive number of experiments performed showed that DropWat is
effective in a variety of scenarios, with different network conditions, even in the
presence of different TCP stack implementations. The robustness of DropWat
was also demonstrated in a scenario involving an attacker that intentionally
drops packets with the aim of obfuscating the watermark.
One of the DropWat’s characteristics is the ability to take advantage of
the network features, the operation of the SS, and the interaction with network
protocols. Nevertheless, as previously stated, the way the SS handles the traffic
may significantly affect the incisiveness and detectability of any watermark. For
instance, a timing-based algorithm needs the SS to work seamlessly, in order to
safeguard the temporal patterns. If an SS uses a “store and forward” method,
in which received data is buffered for a period of time before being forwarded to
the next hop, then all of the watermarking algorithms (including DropWat)
cannot work correctly.
Another limitation is that DropWat is ineffective for short-lived or interac-
tive flows, because the pW must be low enough to ensure that 1) packet dropping
does not affect the throughput, and 2) TP rates are sufficiently high.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new watermarking algorithm for tracing data ex-
filtration attacks. DropWat is an algorithm that has two main characteristics
that differentiate it from other existing solutions for the network traceback prob-
lem. First, DropWat’s embedding algorithm is based on a new paradigm to
impress a watermark within a network flow that takes advantage of a network’s
reaction to packet loss. We have shown that dropping a few selected packets of
a flow allows a timing-based watermark to be embedded into the flow. Second,
the watermark embedded by DropWat is completely invisible to the adver-
sary. The invisibility is due to the fact that the time alteration generated by
an artificially dropped packet is the same as that of a packet that is naturally
lost. In addition, because the statistical behavior of the loss pattern induced by
DropWat fits the loss behavior of a real bottleneck node, an adversary can-
not distinguish between a watermark embedded by DropWat and a natural
loss pattern in the network. Our experimental results showed that DropWat
achieves very high TP rates and very low FP rates even in realistic scenar-
ios where traffic passes through Web proxy servers on AWS or an anonymous
network like TOR.
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